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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Challenging Proposition 187's
Constitutionality: League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 1994, in response to the federal government's failure to
prevent illegal immigration, the people of California voted 59% to 41% to enact
Proposition 187.' This Proposition attempts to remedy the problems California
purportedly suffers at the hands of illegal aliens.' The United States District
Court for the Central District of California immediately issued a temporary
restraining order suspending implementation of Proposition 187. Subsequently,
the court issued a preliminary injunction, and, in League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Wilson,4 the court addressed the constitutionality of
Proposition 187.
Sponsors of Proposition 187 boast that the initiative is socio-politically
advantageous because it will assist in overcoming a statewide recession, saving
California over three billion dollars a year.6 Supporters of Proposition 187 also
assert that the initiative will improve the overall quality of publicly-funded social
services, health care, educational facilities, and public safety in California by
preventing illegal aliens from usurping benefits from these state-funded
programs.7 Furthermore, from a legal standpoint, supporters maintain that
Proposition 187 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of traditional state police
power and that its incidental and indirect effects on immigration do not mandate
federal preemption.8
Conversely, political opponents of Proposition 187 charge their adversaries with
short-sightedness, arguing that California's enforcement of Proposition 187 will
1. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 (West). For the full text of Proposition 187, see Appendix A.
Proposition 187 was enacted by referendum, and subsequently codified in: CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113, 114,
834(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1996); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 130 (West Cum. Supp. 1996); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215, 66010.8 (West Cum. Supp.
1996); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 53069.65 (West Cum. Supp. 1996).
2. See Keith Bradsher et al., The 1994 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMDES, Nov. 10, 1994, at Bll,
available in LEXIS/NFXIS, News Library, Papers File. Throughout this Note, the term "illegal alien" refers
to persons residing in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.
3. See Paul Feldman & Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Judge Blocks Most Sections of Proposition 187; Courts:
Jurist Cites Significant Constitutional Questions. Enforcement Is Delayed Pending Outcome of Lawsuit, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1994, at Al, available in WESTLAW, LAT database, 1994 WL 2378251, at *1.
4. 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
5. See id at 755, 764.
6. See Decision '94: Special Guide to California's Elections; Proposition 187: Is it "Sink Our State" or
"Save Our State"?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at W9, available in WESTLAW, LAT database, 1994 WL
2361164, at *4 [hereinafter Decision '94.
7. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.75 (West Cum. Supp. 1996) (abolishing local prohibitions on
cooperation between the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and police); see also Robert Suro,
Fortress America? Suddenly the Golden Door Is Closing, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1994, at C3, available in
LEXIS/NFXIS, News Library, Papers File.
8. See Suro, supra note 7, at C3. Cf. Michael J. Brady, Arguing Proposition 187: Will It Stand Up in
Court? Yes: No Rights Are Violated, CAL. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 1, 16, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library,
Papers File.
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lead to harmful consequences that substantially outweigh any possible benefits of
the initiative.9 Opponents contend that Proposition 187 will effectuate an increase
in California's crime rate, an increase in the spread of illness, and an increase in
emergency health care costs.' 0 Furthermore, opponents maintain that enforcing
Proposition 187 will result in a permanent class of illiterates because
undocumented alien children will be deprived of a public education." Therefore,
opponents explain, Proposition 187 is socio-politically, economically, and morally
offensive.'
Opponents of Proposition 187 have primarily focused their legal attacks on two
areas: preemption and equal protection.'3 Opponents insist that Proposition 187
is preempted by federal law because the initiative regulates immigration, an area
in which Congress has exercised its exclusive power "[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization."' 4 Moreover, opponents contend that Proposition 187
directly conflicts with the federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 5 In
addition to Proposition 187's preemption effect, opponents assert that several
provisions of Proposition 187 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
6
Part H of this Note summarizes Proposition 187. Part I briefly describes the
procedural history of League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson. Part
IV discusses the federal court's opinion in League of United Latin American
Citizens. Part IV first discusses the court's analysis of Proposition 187's
severability clause. Part IV then explores the federal preemption issues which
Proposition 187's verification and benefit denial provisions raise and examines the
League of United Latin American Citizens court's three-pronged approach to these
issues. Part V analyzes the League of United Latin American Citizens court's
finding that Proposition 187's benefit denial provisions, depending on the type of
benefit and the federal preemption test applied, are (1) completely valid; (2)
completely invalid; or (3) invalid under certain circumstances. Part VI
demonstrates how Proposition 187's benefit denial provisions raise several equal
protection issues and analyzes the League of United Latin American Citizens
court's failure to address these issues.
9. See Decision '94, supra note 6, at W9, 1994 WL 236114, at *5.
10. See id. Political opponents assert that both the spread of illness and the cost of emergency care will
increase because of the state's refusal of publicly-funded non-emergency medical care to thousands of illegal
aliens. See id.
11. See id.
12. Apparently, California did not agree with this notion. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
13. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Arguing Proposition 187: Will It Stand Up in Court? No: 187 Is
Unconstitutional, CAL. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 1, 16.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2 (the Supremacy Clause); see also
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1994).
15. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1994); see also Evangeline G. Abriel, Rethinking Preemption for Purposes
of Aliens and Public Benefits, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1597, 1619-20 (1995).
16. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1, 16.
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II. PROPOSITION 187
Proposition 187 commences with the general declarations of the people of
California, providing for "cooperation between their agencies of state and local
government with the federal government, and ... establish[ing] a system of
required notification by and between such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the
United States from receiving benefits or public services in the State of
California."' 7 Although some opponents of Proposition 187 urge that the
initiative's primary goals are to encourage self-deportation and to curb future
illegal immigration,'8  Proposition 187 does not expressly state these
objectives. 9 Proposition 187's stated objective is limited to preserving
California's resources, including social services, medical care facilities, and
education, by denying publicly-funded benefits to undocumented aliens.'o
Proposition 187 has three distinct components. First, in sections 4-8,
Proposition 187 imposes a duty on California law enforcement personnel,2'
publicly-funded social service22 and health care23 agencies, public elementary
and secondary schools,24 and publicly-funded postsecondary schools' to
attempt to verify whether an applicant, arrestee, or attendee is residing in the
United States in violation of federal immigration laws;26 to notify persons if their
status is determined to be illegal or suspected of being illegal; 27 and to cooperate
with federal immigration authorities and report any suspected illegal aliens to the
Attorney General of California and the federal Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). 28  This first component of Proposition 187 is referred to as the
"verification, notification, and cooperation/reporting scheme," or "verification
scheme."
17. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 1 (West).
18. See, e.g., Suro, supra note 7, at C3 (quoting Alan Nelson, co-author of Proposition 187, on his
admission that the entire scheme of Proposition 187 sends a message to illegal aliens to leave the United States).
Nelson did not distinguish between the objectives of Proposition 187's verification scheme and benefit denial
scheme. See i.
19. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 1 (West). Had these been the express purposes of
Proposition 187, federal law would have entirely preempted the Proposition because it would have been an
express attempt to regulate immigration. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976). When Congress acts
under a constitutionally granted power, state laws which conflict with such congressional acts are preempted.
See id. at 363; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).
20. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 1 (West). The alleged unstated objectives of Proposition
187 are impermissible regulations of immigration, while the Proposition's express objectives are traditional areas
of state police power.
21. See i. § 4.
22. See id § 5.
23. See id § 6.
24. See id § 7.
25. See id. § 8.
26. See id. §§ 4(b)(1), 5(b), 6(b), 7(b), 8(b).
27. See id. §§ 4(b)(2), 5(c)(2), 6(c)(2), 7(e), 8(c).
28. See id §§ 4(b)(3), 5(c)(3), 6(c)(3), 7(e), 8(c).
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The second component of Proposition 187 includes the portions of sections 5-8
which deny publicly-funded benefits to illegal aliens.29 These provisions prohibit
illegal aliens from receiving publicly-funded social services, 3° non-emergency
medical treatment at publicly-funded health care facilities (regardless of whether
the illegal aliens can pay for their treatment), 3' and from attending publicly-
funded elementary,32 secondary,33 or postsecondary schools.' This second
component of Proposition 187 is referred to as the "benefit denial scheme."
The third component of Proposition 187, in sections 2 and 3, imposes criminal
penalties on persons involved in manufacturing, distributing, and using false
citizenship and alien resident status documents.35 Proposition 187 specifically
states that "[a]ny person who manufactures, distributes[,] or sells false documents
to conceal the true citizenship or resident alien status of another person," shall be
either fined $75,000 or sentenced to five years imprisonment.36 Proposition 187
further provides that any person who uses such false documents to conceal true
citizenship or resident alien status shall be either fined $25,000 or sentenced to
five years in prison.37 Although, these criminal provisions have undergone very
little scrutiny, a discussion of their validity is beyond the parameters of this Note.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF LEAGUE OF
UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS V. WILSON
"It is easy to anticipate that [Proposition 187] will ultimately wend its way to
the United States Supreme Court[,]" 3' and receive Congressional attention. 39
In response to California's enactment of Proposition 187, the public interest
group, League of United Latin American Citizens, brought a class action suit
against California Governor Pete Wilson and numerous other California state
officials.4' At the same time as the League of United Latin American Citizens'
29. See id §§ 5-8.
30. See id § 5.
31. See id § 6. This section is not narrowly tailored to deny non-emergency health care exclusively to
illegal aliens who request subsidization for their treatment; rather it forces publicly-funded hospitals and other
public health care providers to refuse treatment even to undocumented aliens willing to pay for their treatment.
32. See id § 7.
33. See id
34. See id § 8.
35. See id §§ 2, 3.
36. See id § 2.
37. See id § 3.
38. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, Joseph F. Baca, Constitutional and Practical
Considerations of Proposition 187, Keynote address delivered to the first Hispanic Heritage Dinner at Marquette
University Law School (Feb. 17, 1995), in 78 MARQ. L. REV. 777, 783 (1995).
39. See Jason A. Dzubow et al., Looking Back; Looking Forward: A Survey of the 103rd Congress and
Projections for the 104th, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 195 (1995) (discussing immigrants' rights as a hot topic for the
104th Congressional session).
40. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763-64 & nn.1, 3 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (citing to the League of United Latin American Citizens' original action, League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV 94-7569 MRP).
[Vol. 27
Winter 1997] LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS V. WILSON 245
suit, several other actions challenging Proposition 187's constitutionality also were
filed in the state and federal courts of California.41
In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,42 the United States
District Court for the Central District of California consolidated the League of
United Latin American Citizens' class action suit with four of the other previously
filed actions.43 The League of United Latin American Citizens plaintiffs sought
to enjoin implementation of Proposition 187 and requested declaratory relief
invalidating Proposition 187."
On November 16, 1994, the United States District Court for the Central District
of California issued a temporary restraining order suspending implementation of
sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of Proposition 187. 45 On December 14, 1995, the court
granted the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction, enjoining the
implementation and enforcement of the challenged sections.'
On May 1, 1995, two of the plaintiffs, the League of United Latin American
Citizens and Gregorio T., moved for summary judgment. The two plaintiffs
argued that the INA,47 among other federal laws, completely preempted
Proposition 187." Defendants countered that federal law did not preempt
Proposition 187, and, alternatively, if the court found any of Proposition 187's
provisions invalid, those provisions could be severed,49 leaving the remainder of
the initiative valid.-'
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, and
denied it in part.51 The court held that federal law preempts Proposition 187's
verification, notification, and cooperation/reporting scheme because this scheme
impermissibly regulates immigration.52 The court further found that state-granted
authority of state agents to deny benefits based on the state agents' reasonable
The League of United Latin American Citizens brought its class action
on behalf of all persons who: (a) are required to be questioned regarding their citizenship or
federal immigration status, or required to produce documentation of their citizenship or federal
immigration status, pursuant to §§ 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 of Proposition 187; (b) are rendered
ineligible for public social services, health care, or education pursuant to §§ 5, 6 and 7 of
Proposition 187; or are required to be reported as not having legal status or notified either to
obtain legal status or leave the United States pursuant to §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, [sic] or 9 of
Proposition 187.
Id. at 763 n.1.
41. Id at 763-64 & nn.l, 3.
42. 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
43. See id. at 763. In addition, the federal district court allowed various other parties, including the City of
Los Angeles, the California Teachers Association, and the California Association of Catholic Hospitals, to
intervene as plaintiffs in the consolidated action. See id. at 763 n.2.
44. See id at 763.
45. See id. at 764.
46. See id
47. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1994).
48. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 764.
49. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 10 (West) (severability clause).
50. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 764.
51. See id
52. See id at 771.
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suspicions directly conflicts with the INA.53 Based on these findings, the court
declared all of the verification scheme provisions (sections 4 and 9,- and certain
portions of sections 5, 6, and 755) invalid under federal preemption doctrine.
5 6
The court, applying three different federal preemption tests, upheld the benefit
denial scheme provisions of Proposition 187 in part and invalidated them in
part.5' The court upheld Proposition 187's denial of public social services58 and
non-emergency health care 59 under two of three federal preemption tests it
applied.' However, under the third preemption test, the court invalidated the
initiative's denial of public social services and non-emergency health care benefits
in specific factual circumstances. 6' Additionally, because of an inadequate
showing under the third preemption test, the court declined to decide whether the
public social services and non-emergency health care benefit denial provisions
were generally preempted.62
In contrast, the court completely upheld the initiative's denial of access to
public postsecondary institutions63 to illegal aliens under all three of its
preemption analyses.6 The court did find, however, that barring illegal alien
children from elementary and secondary public schools, was valid under the first
two preemption tests,65 but preempted under the third test by the United States
Supreme Court case Plyler v. Doe."
53. See id. at 770, 777 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1994)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1996) (giving
exclusive power to determine alien resident status to the federal Immigration Court). Additionally, state officials
who have no training in determining citizenship and alien resident status are not qualified to make these
threshold determinations based on their subjective intuitions, beliefs, and prejudices. See League of United Latin
Ant. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 770.
54. Section 4 of Proposition 187 is entitled "Law Enforcement Cooperation with INS." 1994 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Proposition 187 § 4 (West). Section 9 controls "Attorney General [C]ooperation with the INS." Id. § 9.
55. Section 5 is entitled "Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Social Services." 1d. § 5. Section 6 is
entitled "Exclusion of illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health Care." l41 § 6. Section 7 is entitled "Exclusion
of Illegal Aliens From Public Elementary and Secondary Schools." Id. § 7. The court struck down, as part of
the verification scheme, the subsections of the above three sections which were analogous to sections 4 and 9.
See League of United LatinoAm. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 771-72, 773.
56. See id at 771-75.
57. See id at 781-82. 786.
58. See id. at 771-73 (section 5 valid to the extent that the state agents rely on federal determinations of
immigration status, rather than making their own judgments).
59. See id. at 782-85 (section 6 valid to the extent that the facilities do not receive federal funds under the
Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1994), or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300(aaa-13)
(1994)). Hill-Burton Act and Public Health Service Act programs are federal programs which do not condition
eligibility or access on lawful alienship or citizenship status.
60. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 770-71, 773, 776 (ruling on sections 5 and
6).
61. See id at 780, 781-82, 783, 784-85, 787; see also discussion infra at Part IV.B.3.a.
62. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 780, 787.
63. See id. at 786 (ruling on section 8). The court also upheld sections 2 and 3, which criminalize the
manufacture and use of fraudulent identification materials. See id at 775, 786.
64. See id. at 786 (ruling on section 8).
65. See id at 770, 771, 774, 776.
66. See id at 774 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)) (ruling on section 7). In Plyler v. Doe, the
United States Supreme Court found that a Texas statute, which denied undocumented alien children the right
to a public education, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 457 U.S. 202, 230
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Finally, the court recognized the validity of Proposition 187's severability
clause 67 and severed the invalid verification and benefit denial provisions from
the valid benefit denial provisions." Following the United States District Court's
decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the defendants' motion to
consolidate and expedite appeals. 69 On July 5, 1995, the Ninth Circuit issued its
opinion on the defendants' appeal of the federal court's preliminary
injunctions.70 The Ninth Circuit found that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing the preliminary injunctions, and reserved a holding on the
merits until a permanent injunction was appealed.7' The Ninth Circuit further
explained its "disposition of appeals from most preliminary injunctions may
provide little guidance as to the appropriate disposition on the merits."'72
IV. DISCUSSION OF LEAGUE OF
UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. WILSON
Proposition 187 raises several constitutional issues, including federal
preemption and equal protection. The federal district court addressed the issue
of federal preemption, but skirted the equal protection issues by resting its
decision on preemption grounds alone. 3 Furthermore, the court relied on the
severability clause contained in Proposition 187 to cut out the provisions of
Proposition 187 which were constitutionally objectionable while upholding the
rest of the initiative.
A. Severability
The federal district court acknowledged Proposition 187's severability clause
as provided in section 10 of the initiative. 4 This finding is important because
the court severed both sections and subsections of Proposition 187.' s The court
held that Proposition 187 is severable because "each of Proposition 187's ten
sections, and their respective subsections, is a distinct grammatical unit and thus
is capable of being severed from the other sections and subsections without
affecting the wording of any other section or rendering what remains
unintelligible."' 6 Because sections and subsections of Proposition 187 were
unconstitutional, had the court not upheld Proposition 187's severability clause,
the result would have been a complete invalidation of Proposition 187.
(1982). However, as discussed infra at Part VI, there are several persuasive arguments on both sides of the issue
as to whether Plyler should or should not be extended to California's present situation.
67. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 776-77.
68. See id at 767, 773; see also infra Part V.
69. See Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 54 F.3d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1995).
70. See Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1995).
71. See id at 1004.
72. Id at 1005 (quoting Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1982)).
73. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
74. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 767 (C.D. Cal. 1995). A
discussion of the validity of the severable nature of Proposition 187 is beyond the scope of this Note.
75. See generally id
76. Id at 767.
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
B. Federal Preemption of Proposition 187
State legislation concerning immiAigration and naturalization cannot conflict with
any federally proscribed guidelines 7 because Congress has the exclusive power
"[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization ... . 8 Congress has
exercised this "unquestionably exclusivef" federal power to regulate
immigration79 through a series of legislative acts.' Congress has manifestly
expressed its intent to bar states from enacting any supplemental legislation which
regulates immigration by establishing a comprehensive regulatory system 1
(through the INA'), which governs entrance into the United States, length of
stay, changes in status, and deportation. 83  Even prior to the INA's enactment,
the United States Supreme Court held that states cannot "add to [or] take from the
conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization, and
residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.""
1. The De Canas Preemption Tests
In De Canas v. Bica,85 a case involving a section of the California Labor
Code which purportedly affected immigration,' the United States Supreme Court
set forth three tests to determine whether federal law preempts a state statute
concerning immigration."7 The three tests embody traditional preemption
analysis.88 Failing any one of the three De Canas tests is fatal to a state
immigration law.' 9
In De Canas, the Court held that the California Labor Code did not regulate
immigration.' Justice Brennan, writing for the court,91 held that "the fact that
aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of
immigration .... [E]ven if such local regulation has some purely speculative and
indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally
proscribed regulation of immigration .... ."' The Court explained that section
77. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
78. Id art. I, § 8, cL 4.
79. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
80. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1994).
81. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446 (1974)); see also
Mendozo v. INS, 16 F.3d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1994); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
82. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1994).
83. See id
84. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
85. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
86. Section 2805(a) of the California Labor Code provided that "[n]o employer shall knowingly employ
an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse
effect on lawful resident workers." CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West 1971) (repealed 1988).
87. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-58; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.
Supp. 755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
88. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-56, 357, 363; see also League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F.
Supp. at 768.
89. See League of United Latin Ant Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 768.
90. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 365.
91. See id at 352.
92. I, at 355-56.
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2805(a) of the California Labor Code was well within the traditional state police
power of employment regulation, whereas "regulation of immigration ... is
essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.'"" Although
section 2805(a) may have indirectly affected immigration where the provision was
intended to protect the work force and the economy, the Court found that the
provision was not a regulation of immigration, and therefore not federally
preempted. 94
The first test set forth in De Canas is whether the statute in question is a
"regulation of immigration." 5 If a state law regulates immigration, the Supremacy
Clause" of the United States Constitution demands federal preemption. '
Therefore, a state objective which deters illegal immigration and encourages current
illegal aliens to self-deport is an impermissible regulation of immigration.98
However, the fact that a state law incidently affects undocumented aliens does not
necessarily mandate classification of that law as a regulation of immigration.99
The second De Canas test requires preemption of a state law if the law encroaches
upon a field which Congress clearly intended to occupy.' °° Congress, through the
INA, expressly intends to occupy certain areas of immigration and
naturalization."°' Conversely, Congress does not occupy areas of traditional state
police power, including employment, public health care, and safety."°
The third test of De Canas questions whether the state statute "'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress'... .,"103 Put another way, a statute is preempted under the third test if
it conflicts with federal law, making compliance with both state and federal law
impossible."°
93. 1d at 355.
94. See id, at 355-56.
95. Id at 355.
96. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
97. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
98. See id at 354-55.
99. See id at 355 (ruling that a state law barring employers from knowingly employing illegal aliens is not
a regulation of immigration).
100. See id at 354-57.
101. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. But see De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-57 (ruling that
Congress does not, through the INA, occupy the field of regulating alien employment).
102. See, e.g., De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354.
103. Id at 363 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers
v. Paul, 357 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)).
104. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing
Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd., Inc., 467 U.S. 461,469
(1984)); see also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43.
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2. Federal Preemption and Proposition 187's Verification, Notification,
Cooperation/Reporting Scheme
In League of United Latin American Citizens, the court, in applying the first De
Canas test, readily distinguished the De Canas California Labor Code's tangential
effects on immigration from several aspects of Proposition 187 which directly
regulate immigration.' ° In De Canas, the Code barred employers from know-
ingly employing illegal immigrants residing in the United States.' 6 The United
States Supreme Court found that California's Labor Code did not regulate
immigration, and that Congress did not occupy the field of employment of illegal
aliens."° Conversely, the court held in League of United Latin American
Citizens that Proposition 187's verification scheme unquestionably regulated
immigration." s According to the court, provisions of Proposition 187 which
require[d] state agents to question all arrestees, applicants for
medical and social services, students, and parents of students
about their immigration status; to obtain and examine documents
relating to the immigration status of such persons; to identify
"suspected" "illegal" immigrants present in California; to report
suspected "illegal" immigrants to state and federal authorities; and
to instruct people suspected of being in the United States illegally
to obtain "legal status" or "leave the country""°
directly and substantially regulate immigration.1 The court explained that
"[t]he classification, notification and cooperation/reporting provisions taken
together constitute a regulatory scheme designed to deter illegal aliens from
entering or remaining in the United States... and indeed, defendants have not
seriously urged any other reading."
11
'
Proposition 187's verification scheme also failed the second 2 (federal
occupation of a field) and third113 (conflicting federal and state laws) tests of De
Canas. Congress has clearly exercised its constitutional right to legislate in the area
of immigration, and has occupied the field through the enactment of the INA." 4
Furthermore, Proposition 187 directly conflicts with federally proscribed
immigration guidelines currently used to determine the grounds for deporta-
105. See generally League of United Latin An Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 769. As the court explained,
"[u]nlike the statute at issue in De Canas, various of Proposition 187's provisions have much more than a
'purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration.' Indeed, Proposition 187's verification, notification and
cooperation/reporting requirements directly regulate immigration .... " Id. (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355).
106. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West 1983) (repealed 1988).
107. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-56.
108. See League of United Latin An. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 765, 768-70.
109. See id at 769 (quoting 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 §§ 4(b)(2), 5(c)(2), 6(c)(2) (West)).
110. See id.
111. IL at 765.
112. See id at 775-76.
113. See id at776-86.
114. See id at 775-76; see also Mendozo v. INS, 16 F.3d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1994); Gonzales v. City of
Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983).
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tion. n5 For example, INA regulations "require '[e]very proceeding to determine
the deportability of an alien in the United States [to be] commenced by the filing
of an order to show cause with the [Immigration Court].""' 6 Yet the verifica-
tion scheme implemented by Proposition 187 requires state agents to use their
own discretion and suspicions in making citizenship and resident alien status
determinations that federal law expressly reserves for immigration judges."7
This usurpation of power conferred exclusively on federal immigration judges
clearly contravenes Congressional intent, and makes it impossible for state
agencies to comply with both federal and state laws."'
Thus, the League of United Latin American Citizens court held that the
verification scheme impermissibly regulated immigration"9 and, therefore, was
preempted by the second and third De Canas tests for the very same reasons it
was preempted by the first De Canas test.'2
3. Federal Preemption and Proposition 187's Benefit Denial Scheme
Proposition 187's denial of benefits to illegal aliens can be divided into three
distinct areas: (1) publicly-funded social services and non-emergency health care
(sections 5 and 6); (2) public elementary and secondary education (section 7); and
(3) public postsecondary education (section 8). Applying the three different De
Canas preemption tests,12 1 the League of United Latin American Citizens court
made three separate decisions about the validity of each of the benefit denial
provisions. First, the court found that Proposition 187's denial of public social
services and non-emergency health care to illegal aliens (sections 5 and 6) was
completely valid under the first two De Canas preemption tests.12 However,
under the third De Canas preemption test, the court both declined to decide if
sections 5 and 6 were completely preempted' 3 and found that, in certain factual
instances,124 the denial of social services and non-emergency health care was
federally preempted."z
115. See League of United Latin An Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 777 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994); 8
U.S.C. 1252(a), (b), (c) (1994); 8 C.F.R. 242.1(a) (1996)); see also 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187
§§ 4(a), 5(a), 6(a), 7(a), 9 (West); De Canas, 424 U.S. at 361-62.
116. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 777 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1995); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a) (1994)).
117. See id
118. See id The drafters of Proposition 187 overlooked a simple means of satisfying the third De Canas test.
They could have adopted the federal standard provided by the federal Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) program network which enables state agencies, working in cooperation with the federal
government, to access federal lists of persons illegally residing in the United States. See generally Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7 (1994).
119. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 765.
120. See id at 775-79.
121. See id at 768.
122. See id at 770-71, 772-73
123. See id at 780, 787.
124. See infra notes 134-141 and accompanying text.
125. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 780-85.
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Second, while upholding Proposition 187's denial of public elementary and
secondary schooling to illegal aliens (section 7) under the first two De Canas
preemption tests," the court completely invalidated section 7 under the third
De Canas test.'2 Third, the court completely upheld the validity of Proposition
187's denial of illegal aliens' right to attend public postsecondary educational
facilities (section 8) under all three of the De Canas preemption tests. 2
a. Publicly-Funded Social Services and
Non-Emergency Health Care
The League of United Latin American Citizens court jointly addressed
Proposition 187's denial of publicly-funded social services (section 5) and
publicly-funded non-emergency health care (section 6), using the three De Canas
preemption tests. The court found that under the first De Canas preemption test
(direct regulation of immigration) the denial of publicly-funded social services and
non-emergency health care to illegal aliens was not intended as, and did not
amount to, a direct regulation of immigration by California, to the extent that
California's denial of these benefits did not involve a state determination of the
legal status of persons being denied benefits.' 29 So long as California's denial
of publicly-funded social services and non-emergency health care under sections
5 and 6 fell within the above limitations, the court viewed these benefit denial
provisions as, at most, having an indirect effect on immigration.! 3" Therefore,
the court found that Proposition 187's denial of publicly-funded social services
and non-emergency health care was not preempted under the first De Canas
test.131
The League of United Latin American Citizens court also found that the second
De Canas test (congressional intent to occupy the field) did not preclude
enforcement of Proposition 187's denial of public social services and non-
emergency health care because
nothing in the wording or legislative history of the INA "unmistakably
confirms" an intent to oust state authority to regulate in the public benefits
field, and because, as in De Canas, such an intent cannot be "derived from
126. See id at 770, 776.
127. See id at 785-86; see also discussion infra at Part IV.B.3.b. In fact, the court only summarily analyzed
section 7 under the first two De Canas tests because it foresaw the section's preemption under the third De
Canas test. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 774, 776.
128. See id at 774, 776, 786.
129. See id at 771-73. The stated purpose and effect of sections 5 and 6
[are] not solely to ensure the ouster of persons suspected of being in this country unlawfully.
Rather, they have the additional purpose and effect of excluding persons from obtaining
public social and health care services. To the extent that state actors deny benefits to persons
based on determinations by federal authorities that those individuals are deportable pursuant
to federal law, benefits denial is not a direct regulation of immigration, but rather, has only
the possible indirect effect of deterring "illegal" aliens from coming to California or causing
them to leave.
Id. at 771.
130. See id
131. See id at 771-73.
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the scope and detail of the INA ... governing entry and stay of aliens"
132
Due to the lack of evidence presented by the plaintiffs, the court declined to
make a conclusive finding on whether Proposition 187's denial of public social
services and non-emergency health care was completely preempted under the third
De Canas test (direct conflict between state and federal law). 133 Nevertheless,
the court found several factual instances where the benefit denial provisions of
sections 5 and 6 did conflict with various federal laws, 34 resulting in federal
preemption under the third De Canas test. 35 The court analyzed this conflict
of laws issue in five specific contexts which were brought to the court's attention
by the parties. 36 Each of the five public social services or public health
programs that the court analyzed received federal funding 37 and the federal
statute(s) applicable to the programs "[did] not condition eligibility on lawful
immigration status."'138 Although the court only analyzed the impact that federal
funding and "federal laws authorizing... benefits and services without reference
to immigration status" had on the five programs brought to the court's attention
by the parties, the court stated that the application of sections 5 and 6 would be
preempted whenever a public social service or non-emergency health care
program had the above two characteristics.
39
Conversely, the court found that Proposition 187's denial of access to public
social services and non-emergency health care programs that are wholly state-
funded is not preempted under the third De Canas test because there is no conflict
between the benefit denial provisions and federal law."4  Similarly, in
circumstances where federal-state cooperative programs exist and the applicable
federal statutes actually condition receipt of benefits on legal alien status, the
132. Id at 776 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976)) (first alteration in original).
133. See id at 780 (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158-60 (1978)), 782, 785.
134. See id at 780.
135. See id at 780-81, 785.
136. The denial of access to the following federally-funded programs, which are available "regardless of
immigration status," was found to be preempted by federal law and thus invalid: (1) the Woman's, Infants, and
Children (WIC) program, 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1994), see League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at
780-81 & n.25; (2) child welfare services, see League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 780-81 &
n.26; (3) Hill-Burton Act health care facilities, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 (1994); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 782-83, 785; (4) Public Health Service Act community health centers, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 201-300(aaa-13) (1994); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 783-84, 785.
The fifth area analyzed by the court, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994), was found not to conflict with section 6, and thus not to preempt the application
of section 6's denial of public non-emergency health services. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F.
Supp. at 784-85 & n.34.
137. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 780-81.
138. Id. at 781 (referring to WIC program, 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1994)).
139. See id, at 780, 787. The court, in fact, was skeptical that there were indeed public social service or non-
emergency health care programs which were "purely state-funded." See id If the plaintiffs had made a strong
showing that no such facilities or services in fact existed, it is probable that the court would have completely
preempted sections 5 and 6 under the third De Canas test.
140. See id, at 780, 781-82, 785.
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court found that Proposition 187's denial of public social services does not
conflict with federal law."4
b. Exclusion of Undocumented Alien Children from
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools
The League of United Latin American Citizens court found that the first De
Canas test (state regulation of immigration) did not preempt section 7 of
Proposition 187,42 entitled "Exclusion of Illegal Aliens From Public Elementary
and Secondary Schools."143 However, the court provided a cursory analysis,
recognizing that section 7 would be preempted under the third De Canas test.'"
The court also perfunctorily found that section 7 was not preempted under the
second De Canas test (federal occupation of field). 45
In contrast, the League of United Latin American Citizens court found that
section 7 was entirely preempted by federal law under the third De Canas
test, t46 notwithstanding the impermissible verification scheme contained in
section 7.147 The court, relying on Plyler v. Doe," held that federal law
mandates free elementary and secondary public education to United States
citizens, legal aliens, and illegal aliens.' 49
In Plyler, the United States Supreme Court held that a Texas statute which
denied illegal immigrants access to public elementary and secondary schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15° The
League of United Latin American Citizens court, without discussing in detail its
rationale for applying Plyler to section 7,15' rested its opinion on a broad
reading of Plyler in order to bring section 7 of Proposition 187 within Plyler's
scope, thus resulting in federal preemption under the third De Canas test. 2
141. See id. at 782-83. The court cited the Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) programs as federal-state cooperative social services programs, "eligibility for which Congress
has already conditioned on lawful immigration status . I..." Id  at 782. Verification of immigration status for
the above public social service programs is accomplished "by accessing INS information" through the federal
SAVE system. See id. at 778; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13206-7 (1994); supra note 118.
The issue of federal-state cooperative non-emergency health care programs which have a federal eligibility
prerequisite of "lawflI immigration status" was not analyzed by the court. See id at 782-85.
142. See id. at 770. The court did not conduct a separate analysis of section 7 under the first De Canas test,
but found all of Proposition 187's benefit denial provisions valid under the first test. See id. at 770, 774.
143. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 7 (West).
144. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 774.
145. See id. at 776. The court did not conduct a separate analysis of section 7 under the second De Canas
test, but found all of Proposition 187's benefit denial provisions valid under the second test. See id
146. See id at 785.
147. See id at 774.
148. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
149. See League Of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 774, 785-86 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 205 (1982)). The decision of the court to apply Plyler to section 7 was the court's alone-the "plaintiffs
did not assert Plyler as a basis for conflict preemption of section [7] in their motions for summary judgment
.." Id at 785 n.36.
150. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
151. See League of United Latin AmL Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 785 & n.36.
152. See id at 785 (citing Plyler). The validity of Plyler, and its application to League of United Latin
American Citizens are examined infra Part VI.
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Plyler's nexus to League of United Latin American Citizens will be examined
further in the equal protection discussion below at Part VI.
c. Public Postsecondary Education
The League of United Latin American Citizens court summarily applied the
three De Canas preemption tests to determine whether federal law preempts
Proposition 187's bar of undocumented alien attendance at public postsecondary
institutions. The court found that Proposition 187's denial of postsecondary
education to illegal aliens is not a regulation of immigration under the first De
Canas test because section 8's denial does "not amount to [a state]
determination[] of who may and may not remain in this country."' 15 3 The League
of United Latin American Citizens court also quickly found that Proposition 187's
denial of postsecondary eduction did not violate the second De Canas test
(occupation of the field) because Congress, through the INA, had not expressed
an intent to preclude state regulation of public benefits." Finally, the court
briefly held that section 8 did not violate the third De Canas test because no
federal law appeared to conflict with Proposition 187's denial of public
postsecondary education to aliens unlawfully residing in the United States, nor did
the plaintiffs contend otherwise."'
V. ANALYSIS-PREEMPTION OR NON-PREEMPTION OF
BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS
Proposition 187's stated objective is to preserve California's resources."
Taking this objective at face value, the League of United Latin American Citizens
court readily severed the provisions allegedly aimed only at preserving state
resources (the benefit denial scheme) from those provisions that were express
regulations of immigration (the verification scheme).15 The court proposed that
if state agencies merely administer federal determinations of citizenship and
resident alien status,' rather than making their own determinations, the benefit
denial provisions, to the extent they do not conflict with federal law, are not
153. League of United Latin An. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 774. The court's analysis of section 8 under the
first De Canas test echoes the court's analysis of sections 5 and 6 under the same test. See supra notes 129-131
and accompanying text.
154. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 776 & n.14 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351, 359 (1976)). As in De Canas, an intent to oust state authority to regulate public benefits "cannot be
'derived from the scope and detail of the INA' ...." Id at 776.
155. See id at 786.
156. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 1 (West).
157. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 786-87. The court did not address the
potential constitutional preemption issues regarding the lack of uniformity among states in relation to disparate
treatment of illegal aliens residing in the United States where the United States Constitution requires a uniform
system of naturalization. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
158. These determinations are accessible through the federal SAVE program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7
(1994); see also supra notes 118 and 141. SAVE verifies eligibility status for federal-state cooperative
programs. See, e.g., id §§ 1320b-7(b)(1), (d) (1994) (AFDC is a program which must participate in the SAVE
system). AFDC is a federal program providing financial and other assistance to families, conditioned on lawful
alienship status. See id §§ 601-617 (1994).
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preempted because they do not amount to state immigration status
determinations.
15 9
Careful examination of the court's partial validation of Proposition 187's
benefit denial provisions reveals that the court's decision rested solely on the
grounds that these provisions did not conflict with the INA to the extent that the
state agencies rely on federal determinations of residency status under the federal
SAVE16° program. 6' The court's approach under the third De Canas test
(conflicting federal and state immigration laws) partially invalidated the social
services and health care provisions and completely validated the postsecondary
education provision, 62 but failed to seriously consider the possibility of
complete preemption of these provisions under the first De Canas test (direct
regulation of immigration).'
The court should have more adequately analyzed whether denying illegal aliens
public social services, health care from publicly-funded facilities, and the
opportunity to attend public postsecondary schools (and elementary and secondary
schools) are attempts to regulate immigration, thus giving cause for preemption
under the first De Canas test. Instead, the court limited its address of the
applicability of the first De Canas test to conclusions with little supportive
evidence or rationale. The court found that benefit denial provisions are
unenforceable to the extent that publicly-funded social service agencies and health
care facilities accept federal funding conditioned on a guarantee that treatment,
assistance, and/or education will be given to all persons residing in the locale of
the facility.' 64 If 'any state facilities exist that do not receive conditional, federal
159. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 779-80.
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7 (1994).
161. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 779.
162. For example, the court held that the third De Canas test did not preempt section 8's bar of illegal aliens
from public postsecondary schools because it did not conflict with the INA. See id at 786. The court also found
that Proposition 187's denial of public postsecondary education was not preempted under the second De Canas
test. See id. at 779-80. Arguably, however, based on the circumstances under which Proposition 187 was enacted,
the court could have deemed each benefit denial an attempt to regulate immigration because each benefit denial
sends a blatant message to illegal aliens to leave the country. If so, the court could have allowed the defendants
to present evidence on the issue, rather than summarily dismissing it.
163. See id at 777-85. Perhaps the court took literally Justice Brennan's statement that "regulation of
immigration.. . is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and
the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976). However,
a literal interpretation of Justice Brennan's statement is arguably invalid. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 379 (1971) ("Alien residency requirements for welfare benefits necessarily operate... to discourage
entry into or continued residency in the State[,]" and therefore serve to regulate immigration.).
164. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 780-85; see also, Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 291c(e) (1994) (requiring facilities applying for federal funding under this Act to promise to provide "a
reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay" (emphasis added)). The regulations clarify that "all
persons" means "persons residing ... in the facility's service area without discrimination on the ground of race,
color, national origin, creed, or any other ground unrelated to an individual's need for the service or the
availability of the needed service in the facility." Public Health Service Act, 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(1) (1995).
The court did not specifically address whether section 8 (and section 7) would be preempted under the third
De Canas test to the extent that the educational institutions received federal-funding and federal law did not
require legal immigration status to attend. See League of United Latin Am Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 785-86.
Logically, however, sections 7 and 8 would be partially or completely preempted under the third De Canas test
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funding as described above, then those state agencies' denials of benefits to illegal
aliens is permissible under the third De Canas preemption test.165
Notwithstanding the court's recognition that denying illegal aliens public social
services and non-emergency health care from state-funded facilities is not preempted
under the first two De Canas tests and only preempted in limited contexts under the
third De Canas test (declining to decide if sections 5 and 6 were generally
preempted under the third test), the court upheld these two sections in name only.
For example, many publicly-funded health care facilities accept federal assistance
under the Hill-Burton Act'66 and, therefore, illegal aliens will not actually be
denied medical treatment based solely on their residency status. The court cleverly
diffused sections 5 and 6; while circumventing troublesome inquiries under the first
De Canas federal preemption test concerning whether state regulations denying state
benefits to illegal aliens, which are clearly within the area of traditional state police
power, also serve to regulate immigration. 67
Despite the fact that the benefit denial provisions are semantically glossed to
express an intent to regulate areas of traditional state police power, the question of
whether they also serve to regulate immigration deserves inquiry. Arguably, all of
the benefit denial provisions contained in Proposition 187 are similar to the
verification scheme-regulations of immigration. " Denying illegal aliens the
right to receive publicly-funded social services, health care, and a public education
will inevitably deter illegal immigration to California and force illegal aliens
presently residing in California to leave the state.
It is well settled that Proposition 187 would have been invalidated under the first
De Canas preemption test if the Proposition's stated intent in denying benefits was
to regulate immigration. 69 However, this is not the express objective of the
legislation.1 70 Unfortunately, because Proposition 187 arose by referendum, no
if the state's schools received federal funding and there were no federal immigration status requirement for
attendance or if Plyler were read to authorize access to all public schools--elementary, secondary, and
postsecondary-regardless of the attendee's immigration status.
165. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 782-83. The denial of benefits is permissible
under the third De Canas test only to the extent that the state agencies use the SAVE network, rather than
making their own citizenship and resident alien status determinations. See supra note 118.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1994). See Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens' Access to Public
Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475, 1498 n.103 (1995).
167. The example given above of the court's treatment of Proposition 187's denial of publicly-funded non-
emergency health care applies equally to the court's treatment of Proposition 187's denial of publicly-funded
social services, and arguably to the court's treatment of Proposition 187's denial of access to elementary,
secondary, and postsecondary education. However, given the court's complete preemption of Proposition 187's
denial of access to elementary and secondary educational institutions, the above analysis is moot in the context
of section 7.
168. Although Proposition 187's benefit denials seem free of federal regulatory characteristics, one can infer
that they serve as latent regulations of immigration. For example, the sections of Proposition 187 which contain
benefit denial provisions require state agents to tell illegal aliens either to obtain legal status or leave the country.
See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 §§ 4, 5, 6 (West). State regulation of immigration is impermissible
under federal preemption principles and the first De Canas test. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,354 (1976).
169. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354 (regulating immigration is an exclusive federal power).
170. This Article presents the argument that such an objective can be implied from the surrounding facts and
circumstances.
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
legislative history exists to assist in determining legislative intent. Nevertheless,
relying on other evidence, a fact-finding body could reasonably infer that the
objective underlying the verification and benefit denial schemes is to regulate the
influx of immigrants into the United States, encouraging self-deportation and
discouraging future illegal immigration. 7
Although Proposition 187's benefit denial provisions govern areas of traditional
state police power, this attribute does not preclude the provisions from preemption
analysis. An express permissible state police power objective"T 2 "does not
provide... state immunity [from federal preemption], for almost any law can be
couched in terms of legitimate local concern."73 Furthermore, no matter how
vital a permissible concern is to a state, if its legislation is in any way a direct
regulation of immigration, it is federally preempted.
174
Similarly, a state statute is invalid if it is enacted in reaction to flaws in federal
policy or enforcement. 75 Proposition 187 is conspicuously drafted in reaction
to ineffective federal enforcement of immigration laws.176 Sections 4, 5, and 6
require state agents to notify the person of his or her apparent illegal immigration
status, and that person "must either obtain legal status or leave the United
States."177 The same intent is implicit in sections 7 and 8. Section 7 requires
that the parents or legal guardian of a student who "cannot establish legal status"
be notified that the student may not attend school after ninety days from such
notice "unless legal status [of the student] is established."178 Furthermore,
"[s]uch ninety day period shall be utilized to accomplish an orderly transition to
a school in the child's country of origin.179 Section 8 mandates that a student
who is known, determined, or suspected to be an illegal alien be notified that he
171. Alan Nelson, co-author of Proposition 187 said "[Proposition 187] sends a message to ... illegal
alien[s] that we will not tolerate their living here against the law and that they should go home." Suro, supra
note 7. at C3. This inference is also supported by the Proposition 187 proponents' implicit dissatisfaction with
federal enforcement of immigration laws. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 1 (West); see also supra
notes 6-8, 18, 111 and accompanying text.
172. For example, pennissible state police power objectives include health and safety. See JOHN E. NOWAK
& RO NALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.2 (5th ed. 1995); see also De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354
(areas of traditional state police power include employment, public health care, and safety).
173. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 967
(1995). Manheim, an attorney, represents one of the plaintiffs in League of United Latin American Citizens.
174. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-56; see also Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1875)
(addressing state regulation of commerce).
175. See Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980) (invalidating a Board of
Regents' action barring Iranian students from a state university in response to the taking of American hostages).
176. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 1 (West).
177. See i. §§ 4(b)(2), 5(c)(2), 6(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 10001.5(c)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1996) (social service agents); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 130(c)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1996) (publicly-funded health care agents); CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b(b)(2) (West
Cum. Supp. 1996) ("[e]very law enforcement agency in California"). Notifying a person that he or she must
leave the country based on his or her immigration status is a direct attempt to regulate immigration and is,
arguably, inseparable from the benefit denial structure.
178. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 7(e) (West) (emphasis added).
179. See id. § 7(f) (emphasis added).
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or she is violating federal immigration laws and that the student not be allowed
to attend a public postsecondary school.'go
The language in sections 4-8 is a conspicuous attempt to regulate immigration.
If this attempt is deemed applicable to the denial of benefits, including the denial
of undocumented alien children to public schools, then such provisions should
also be preempted under the first De Canas test.'' As one immigration scholar
suggested, "[t]his badge and display of state authority has the avowed purpose
and obvious practical impact [of] an order of deportation."'"
Proposition 187's benefit denial provisions may not be limited merely to
regulating traditional areas of state police power, but may impermissibly regulate
immigration as well. Although not addressed by the League of United Latin
American Citizens court, factual and legal bases exist to support the argument that
Proposition 187's benefit denial provisions implicitly serve to encourage illegal
aliens to "self-deport"'8 3 and discourage future illegal immigration. Such results
might constitute unconstitutional state regulation of immigration under the first
De Canas federal preemption test.
VI. BENEFIT DENIAL PROVISIONS: A VIOLATION
OF EQUAL PROTECTION?
[N]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.' 4
It is well settled that aliens lawfully residing in the United States shall be
afforded equal protection under the law.8 5 The Supreme Court has determined
alienage to be a suspect classl 6 and therefore courts are bound to review
180. See id §§ 8(a), (c).
181. Arguably, the court in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995), could have tied an attempt to regulate immigration to Proposition 187's denial of benefits where the state
agents, upon denial of such benefits, were required to tell illegal aliens either to obtain legal status or leave the
country. This would have been a simple way to invalidate sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 entirely. This can be
distinguished from Doe v. Plyler, where, at the district court level, the court held that the Texas law did not have
"either the purpose or effect of keeping illegal aliens out of the State of Texas." 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D.
Tex. 1978).
182. Manheim, supra note 173, at 971.
183. In part, Governor Pete Wilson's campaign platform was to encourage "self-deportation." See George
Raine, Wilson Leads Brown in 2nd Straight Poll in a Tight Race, SAN. FRAN. EXAMINER, Sept. 23, 1994, at A4,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1994 WL 11604571, at *3.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
185. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (holding that state regulations which barred
distribution of public social service benefits to legal aliens, unless they have resided in the United States for a
requisite number of years, violates equal protection); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,420 (1948)
(state denial of fishing license to lawful aliens violates equal protection); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640
(1948) (state denial of aliens' rights to own and transfer agricultural land violates equal protection); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (state denial of licenses in a discriminatory manner violates equal protection).
186. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72. However, the Court has created several exceptions to strict scrutiny
review of alienage-based discrimination for certain governmental employees. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (barring aliens from serving as probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
80-81 (1979) (barring aliens from serving as public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 292
(1978) (upholding New York statute barring aliens from serving on the state police force).
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statutory discrimination against legal aliens with strict scrutiny."" Under the
strict scrutiny standard, in order to uphold a discriminatory statute, the court must
find that the discrimination is necessary to a compelling government interest.
88
Statutes rarely overcome the rigid requirements of strict scrutiny.8 9
Unlike aliens lawfully residing in the United States, aliens illegally residing in
the United States have not been given suspect class status.' 9 For this reason,
statutes discriminating against illegal aliens have not been reviewed with strict
scrutiny." Despite the Supreme Court's attempt to address issues surrounding
the applicable equal protection standards set forth in Plyler, the appropriate review
for all statutes discriminating against illegal aliens remains unsettled.' 92 Should
courts review these statutes under intermediate-level scrutiny, traditional rational
basis review, or even strict scrutiny?' 9' To survive intermediate-level scrutiny
review,194 the government must prove that the discriminatory classification is
substantially related to an important permissible governmental objective. 95 In
order to withstand rational basis review, the government must only show that the
discriminatory classification is rationally related to the governmental interest."9
Although the League of United Latin American Citizens court briefly discussed
Proposition 187's denial of public elementary and secondary education to illegal
aliens as a violation of the equal protection holding of Plyler v. Doe,197 the
court neglected to directly address whether Proposition 187's benefit denial
provisions violate an illegal alien's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
187. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382 (holding that aliens are a "suspect class," and, therefore, legal
classifications based on alienage must be reviewed under strict scrutiny).
188. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 172, § 14.3, at 601-02, 606.
189. In the last fifty-five years, no statute containing intentional racial discrimination has withstood strict
scrutiny review. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-6, at 1451-52 (2d ed. 1988).
Strict scrutiny review is "'strict' in theory and usually 'fatal' in fact." Id. (quoting Gerald Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)).
190. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
191. See id, at 210 (illegal aliens are not suspect because their existence in this country comes from unlawful
acts). However, this may be an overstatement because there are lawfully admitted, but unlawfully present, aliens
in the United States (e.g., persons who remain in the United States after the expiration of their visas).
192. See generally Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. The Court reviewed a state statute affecting undocumented alien
children with intermediate-level scrutiny, but the rationale for application of intermediate-level scrutiny was in
part because the classification dealt with "innocent children" and education. See generally id. at 219-24.
193. See id, at 219.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 & n.16; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
195. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 (relying on the district court's findings that the government did not provide
sufficient evidence that this classification would further a permissible state interest); Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980).
196. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
Under the rational basis review level a court is extremely limited in its inquiry as to whether the
discrimination effectively assists in reaching the government's objective; rather, a court should uphold the
legislation if the discrimination could possibly assist in reaching the governmental objective. See generally
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 466.
197. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
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Amendment. 198 Because current federal law in this area is quite murky, further
discussion is required.
A. The Right to Attend Public Elementary and Secondary Schools
"We cannot educate every child from here to Tierra del Fuego."
-Governor Pete Wilson
19
The League of United Latin American Citizens court concluded that Proposition
187's exclusion of any child "not a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully
admitted as a permanent resident, or a person who is otherwise authorized under
federal law to be present in the United States"'  from public elementary and
secondary schools directly conflicted with Plyler's holding that similar
discrimination violated equal protection. 2' However, the court avoided the
equal protection issue and instead held that section 7 of Proposition 187, under
all three De Canas tests, was entirely preempted by federal law.2 2
In Plyler, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that a
Texas law which denied the children of illegal aliens the right to free public
education violated equal protection. 20 The stated purposes of the Texas law
were 1) to decrease the influx of illegal immigrants into Texas;' 2) to deter
the presence of illegal aliens in public schools where they hinder the state's
ability to provide for quality education; 2° 5 and 3) to deter the presence of
undocumented children from the Texas public schools because they are less likely
than other children to remain in the state and therefore bring revenues into the
state.2
The Court rejected strict scrutiny review of the Texas statute because
undocumented aliens and their children are not a "suspect class"'  and education
198. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 785-86 (C.D. Cal. 1995). In
analyzing Proposition 187's bar of undocumented alien children from public elementary and secondary schools,
the court did not examine the merits of the equal protection issue; rather, it found that the provisions were
preempted by federal law as mandated by Plyler. See id.
199. Daniel M. Weintraub & Bill Stall, Wilson Would Expel Illegal Immigrants from Schools Politics, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1994, at Al, available in WESTLAW, LAT database, 1994 WL 2345554, at *2 (quoting
Governor Pete Wilson).
200. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 187 § 7(a) (West).
201. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 774 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230).
202. See id at 770, 776, 785-86.
203. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 n.2. The Court reviewed the Texas law with intermediate-level scrutiny. See
id Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion. See id. at 205. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell filed
concurring opinions. See id at 230, 231, 236. Then-Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justices White, Rehnquist (now Chief Justice), and O'Connor joined. See id at 242.
204. See id at 228.
205. See id. at 229.
206. See id. at 229-30.
207. Id. at 219 n.19. Additionally some commentators have proposed that there is an inherent contradiction
in the Court's ruling that aliens are a "suspect class," while "undocumented aliens" are not, where undocumented
aliens are similarly a "discrete and insular minority," United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4, and evidence suggests that they are subject to even more discrimination and abuse than documented
aliens. Cf. infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text; Manheim, supra note 173, at 944.
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is not a fundamentally guaranteed constitutional right.m The Court also rejected
traditional rational basis review,' opting to review the Texas act under
intermediate-level scrutiny.210 After determining the proper level of review, the
Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the state did not demonstrate a
substantially related nexus between the discriminatory classification and the
purported state objectives.2
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that rational basis review is proper when
there is no suspect classification and no denial of a fundamental right.2 12 Under
rational basis review, Proposition 187's section 7 could potentially survive equal
protection challenges because there is a tenable nexus between the government's
objective13 and the discrimination.214
Unlike illegal aliens, aliens lawfully present in the United States are a suspect
class.21 5 "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
208. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
209. See id. at 230. But see id at 248, 250 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (The applicable standard of review is
rational basis: "By definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state may reasonably,
and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with governmental services at the expense of those who are
lawfully in the state.").
210. See id at 230. The Court chose intermediate-level scrutiny where both innocent children and education
were involved. However, "[is the Court suggesting that education is more 'fundamental' than food, shelter, or
medical care?" Id. at 248 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
211. See id. at 228-30 (defendants did not provide any convincing evidence that illegal aliens posed more
of a financial burden on Texas than any other persons).
212. See id. at 248. Present Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and White joined the then-
presiding Chief Justice in his dissent. See ld. at 242. Chief Justice Burger wrote that the majority used
intermediate-level scrutiny in a result-oriented manner. See id at 244. This suggests that Plyler was a decision
based on politics, rather than on a firmly grounded legal foundation.
Several commentators have speculated that the current Supreme Court, if faced with the same issue, might
rule that rational basis is the appropriate level of review. Plyler dissenting Justices Rehnquist (now Chief Justice)
and O'Connor would likely sustain their position. Conservative Justices Thomas and Scalia would likely join,
and one more "aye" vote from either Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, or Justice Breyer is
possible. See Larry Bumgardner and Shannon Rogers, Taking Bets on How the Supreme Court Might Side on
Proposition 187, Los ANGELES DAiLY NEWs. Aug. 6, 1995, at V3, available in WESTLAW, Alinews database,
1995 WL 5414201, at *3-*6; Richard Carelli, Few Clues Found to High Court's Proposition 187 Mood; Panel's
Previous Illegal Alien Ruling Could Be Reversed, SAN. FRAN. EXAMINER, Nov. 13, 1994, at A4, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1994 WL 4278864, at *3-*6; Paul Feldman. Texas Decision Affects Proposition
187 Will Pave the Way for Supreme Court to Take a Second Look, THE FRESNO BEE, Oct. 24. 1994, at Al,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1994 WL 9104317, at *5.
213. The implied objective of section 7 of Proposition 187 is to reserve public elementary and secondary
education for persons lawfully residing in California. See Ken Chavez, Wilson Wants Part of Proposition 187
Ruling Axed, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Alnews database, 1995 WL
10554471, at *2.
214. The rational basis standard has very little bite. See United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (The rational basis standard requires only a "plausible reason" for the classification. "It
is.. . 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision ... ' (quoting
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483
(1955). But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The
State's rationale must be something more than the exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection
between means and ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis.").
215. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
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processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 216 Like legal aliens,
illegal aliens are also "perennial losers in the political struggle. ' 217
Furthermore, although both legal aliens and illegal aliens have little political
power due to their inability to vote, evidence suggests illegal aliens are more
often the targets of discrimination. 218 This evidence supports the position that
illegal aliens deserve suspect class status and are accordingly entitled to strict
scrutiny review.219 This reasoning suggests that a court should afford regulations
discriminating against illegal aliens strict scrutiny review. 22 However, a court,
when faced with issues concerning the proper level of review of section 7's
treatment of illegal alien children and of the constitutional status of those
children, is more likely simply to adopt the majority opinion in Plyler, and apply
intermediate-level scrutiny.
Yet, even if intermediate-level scrutiny were to be applied to section 7 of
Proposition 187, the situation in California is factually distinguishable from that
of Texas.22' Therefore, if the defendants receive the opportunity on remand,
after an appeal, they could introduce evidence sufficient to support the conclusion
that the classification is substantially related to an important permissible
governmental objective.
B. Narrowing Plyler v. Doe
The League of United Latin American Citizens court's interpretation of Plyler
v. Doe's holding that federal law "prohibits states from excluding undocumented
alien children from [elementary and secondary] public schools" is arguably an
overstatement of the law.2m Plyler rested on an equal protection analysis, basing
its holding on the lower court's finding that Texas did not present any evidence
probative of the "substantial relationship" between depriving illegal immigrant
children of free elementary and secondary education and preserving state
resources. 
2Z
Conversely, California is a haven for illegal aliens. As of October 1992, 43%
of the nation's illegal immigrants had settled in California, making up just under
5% of the state's overall population. 224 In California, approximately 308,000
illegal alien children are enrolled in the public schools at a cost of approximately
1.4 to 1.6 billion dollars per year.- Therefore, even following Plyler's
216. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
217. TRIBE, supra note 189, § 16-6, at 1454 (arguing that being a "perennial loser[] in the political struggle"
is a factor which should be considered when determining whether a group is a suspect class).
218. See id
219. See id
220. Cf. Manheim, supra note 173, at 944.
•221. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
222. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
223. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228-30 (1982).
224. See REBECCA L. CLARK ET AL., THE URBAN INSTrfruT, FISCAL IMPAcTS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS:
SELECTIVE ESTIMATES FOR SEVEN STATES ii (Sept. 1994).
225. See David Andrew Price, Educating Illegal Aliens: Nation, Not State, Should Pay Tab, TIE PHOENIX
GAZETE, Nov. 16, 1994, at B7, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database, 1994 WL 6338831, at *2.
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intermediate-level scrutiny rule, section 7 of Proposition 187 could withstand
equal protection muster so long as a fact-finding body finds evidence of a
substantial nexus between the classification and an important state objective.
Whether it be strict scrutiny, intermediate-level scrutiny, or traditional rational
basis review, California has, at least arguably, sufficient evidence to justify
distinguishing Proposition 187's section 7 from Plyler.2
C. The Right to Other Publicly-Funded Benefits
The League of United Latin American Citizens court made its findings
concerning the denial of public social services, public non-emergency medical
care, and the right to attend public postsecondary schools on preemption grounds
alone, without contemplating the several equal protection issues which Proposition
187 raises. Yet these provisions implicate equal protection controversies
warranting exploration.
One way of broadly interpreting Plyler leads to the conclusion that illegal
aliens, as a class, should be afforded intermediate-level scrutiny review.2'
Applying this standard would enable a court to closely examine the purported
permissible state objective' and possibly invalidate the benefit denial
provisions upon a finding that the government did not provide evidence of a
substantial relationship between the objective and the discrimination.'
The Supreme Court's logic regarding education as a quasi-fundamental right
in Plyler also can be cited for the conclusion that Proposition 187's benefit denial
provisions affect quasi-fundamental rights, and, therefore, should be reviewed
under intermediate-level scrutiny. According to Justice Brennan, the right to a
public education is quasi-fundamental because it is imperative in preventing
illegal immigrants from remaining a permanent lower class."' Because housing,
food, shelter, and medical treatment are equally imperative for survival, and also
enable a person to make positive contributions to the state, these necessities
should be treated as quasi-fundamental as well. 2
226. But see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227. "Of course, a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone
can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources." M, (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971)).
227. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 782-84 (noting that where the benefit denial
provisions conflicted with federally funded benefit programs that were conditioned on providing services to
persons such as illegal aliens, the benefit denials provisions are not enforceable); see also Hill-Burton Act, 42
U.S.C. § 291 (1994); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300(aaa-13) (1994).
228. This would not necessarily undermine Justice Brennan's distinction in Plyler between illegal immigrants
and illegal immigrant children, 457 U.S. at 219-23, where all of the benefit denial provisions, although not
expressly directed at children, would certainly affect children. Furthermore, medical care, food, and shelter are
as "fundamental" as education in illegal immigrants' attempts to alleviate their permanent lower class status. See
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 248 (Burger, CJ.. dissenting).
229. In contrast, under rational basis review courts should not closely examine the effectiveness of a
classification and its nexus to a permissible state interest.
230. But see discussion supra Part VI.B.
231. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23.
232. For completely different reasons, neither the majority nor the dissent in Plyler support this conclusion.
See generally id.
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The above reasoning alone warrants a finding that intermediate-level scrutiny
is applicable to all of Proposition 187's benefit denial schemes. However, the
Plyler majority, in arriving at intermediate-level scrutiny, also considered that
"innocent children" felt the pinch of the Texas law. a3 Similarly, innocent
children will be affected when they, or their parents, are denied non-emergency
medical treatment, housing benefits, and other social services because of their
illegal residence status.' Following this logic, the denial of social services and
non-emergency medical care assists in creating a permanent lower class of illegal
aliens, and also adversely affects innocent children. Therefore, the appropriate
review for the benefit denial provisions in sections 5 and 6 of Proposition 187 is
235intermediate-level scrutiny.
In sum, if a reviewing court does address the equal protection issues inherent
in Proposition 187, the reviewing court's decision about Proposition 187's destiny
is extremely unpredictable. Plausible arguments exist for the court's application
of intermediate-level review, rational basis review, and even strict scrutiny review
of Proposition 187's denial of benefits to illegal aliens.
1. Public Postsecondary Schooling
Although section 8, which denies illegal aliens the right to attend public
postsecondary schools, has undergone little scrutiny, there is a viable argument
that this denial may also violate equal protection. The permissible state interests
for denying public postsecondary education to illegal aliens are preservation of
state financial resources and maintenance and improvement of the quality of
publicly-funded universities. Even under rational basis review, to pass equal
protection muster, a conceivable relationship between the discriminatory
classification and the governmental ends must exist. -6  Section 8's
discrimination against all illegal aliens does not further either the state's interest
in preserving financial resources or in preserving the educational quality of
universities. If some illegal aliens are willing to finance their own education,
rather than request state subsidization, then these persons would actually be
contributing funds to state resources.
Furthermore, there exists no compelling argument that allowing illegal aliens
to attend public postsecondary schools will hinder the quality of these
schools. 7 Therefore, the claim that illegal aliens, in their quest for public
233. See id. at 224.
234. But see id at 221 (arguing that only education is quasi-fundamental, it is not "merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation").
235. However, this is certainly not the interpretation of Plyler that the majority envisioned. The Court
intended to limit intermediate scrutiny review of undocumented aliens to children's rights to public elementary
and secondary education because children's alien status, unlike their parents, is not volitional, see Plyler, 457
U.S. at 219-20 (Brennan, J.), 238-39, 240 (Powell, J., concurring), and because education is a more fundamental
right than social welfare, see id at 221 (Brennan, J.), 230 (Marshall, J., concurring), 231, 234, 236 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
236. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 438-42 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
237. One possible argument in support of the classification however, would be that the universities are
overcrowded, making public postsecondary education a limited resource, and therefore, illegal aliens would be
taking limited resources from lawful residents.
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postsecondary education, are usurping state funds and thus impairing the quality
of public education is tenuous at best.238
2. Publicly-Funded Health Care
Similar to Proposition 187's sections concerning postsecondary education, the
provisions which deny publicly-funded health care are also poorly drafted. 239
There is little economic justification to deny medical treatment to persons willing
to pay for their own treatment merely because of their alien residency status. Yet,
Proposition 187 has this effect.'
VII. CONCLUSION
The only finding by the League of United Latin American Citizens court
discussed in this Note that is not likely subject to scrutiny by a reviewing court
is the finding that the verification scheme promulgated by Proposition 187
regulates immigration. This finding might be challenged, but the semantics of
Proposition 187's verification scheme express an unquestionable intent to regulate
immigration.
Although Proposition 187 was enacted by referendum, and regulating
immigration is not the express intent of the initiative's benefit denial provisions,
evidence exists which supports the inference that the entire initiative is a federally
impermissible attempt by the people of California to regulate immigration.
However, with the exception of denying children enrollment in public elementary
and secondary schooling, the League of United Latin American Citizens court
found that denying benefits to illegal aliens is a permissible state objective so
long as the benefit denial provisions do not conflict with federal law.
The court may have done so because Congress has denied similar benefits to
similar classes ." Yet, affirmative Congressional action denying federally-
funded benefits to certain resident alien classes does not serve as either a legal or
logical basis for concluding that a state denial of benefits does not regulate
immigration. Arguably this creates room for reversing the League of United Latin
American Citizens court's findings that as a matter of law sections 5 and 6 are not
federally preempted under the first and second De Canas tests, and only partially
preempted under the third De Canas test; that section 7 is only preempted under
the third De Canas test; and that section 8 is completely valid under all three De
Canas tests.
238. Proposition 187 could have avoided this controversy simply by restricting the denials to persons
requesting state subsidization of education expenses.
239. The drafters could have tailored Proposition 187 so that it would not deny health care to illegal aliens
procuring their own payment for treatment. Taking this measure would have provided a stronger economic
justification for the denials.
240. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 782-84 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
Although, if the evidence suggested that publicly-funded hospitals were overcrowded, making them a limited
resource, then such evidence would support the validity of the denials based on a preservation of state resources
rationale.
241. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(b)(1), (d) (1994) (AFDC is a program which must participate in SAVE
system); see also supra note 158.
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Regarding equal protection, questions exist as to which level of scrutiny is
applicable to illegal aliens. California, if afforded the opportunity, might present
evidence sufficient to overcome rational basis review, and possibly even
intermediate-level scrutiny. By taking advantage of Plyler's characterization of
education as a quasi-fundamental right and of illegal aliens and "innocent
children" as quasi-suspect classes, an appellate court might validly conclude that
intermediate-level scrutiny is applicable to the denial of publicly-funded social
services, non-emergency health care, and education thereby allowing a court
inquiry into the relationship between California's discrimination against
undocumented aliens and Proposition 187's purpose.
The question remains whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal,
or even the Supreme Court on certiorari, will completely invalidate Proposition
187, will uphold the district court's summary judgment decree entirely, or will
invalidate some and revive other sections of Proposition 187.
JOSHUA FOXU2
242. Mr. Fox is a third-year law student at the University of Miami School of Law and an Associate Editor
of the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review.
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSITION 187
SECTION 1. Findings and Declaration.
The People of California find and declare as follows:
That they have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by the
presence of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage caused
by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have a right to the protection of their government from any person
or persons entering this country unlawfully.
Therefore, the People of California declare their intention to provide for
cooperation between their agencies of state and local government with the federal
government, and to establish a system of required notification by and between
such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the United States from receiving benefits
or public services in the State of California.
SECTION 2. Manufacture, Distribution or Sale of False Citizenship or Resident
Alien Documents: Crime and Punishment.
Section 113 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
113. Any person who manufactures, distributes or sells false documents to
conceal the true citizenship or resident alien status of another person is guilty of
a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five years
or by a fine of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000).
SECTION 3. Use of False Citizenship or Resident Alien Documents: Crime and
Punishment.
Section 114 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
114. Any person who uses false documents to conceal his or her true
citizenship or resident alien status is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for five years or by a fine of twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000).
SECTION 4. Law Enforcement Cooperation with INS.
Section 834b is added to the Penal Code, to read:
834b. (a) Every law enforcement agency in California shall fully cooperate with
the Unites States Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding any person
who is arrested if he or she is suspected of being present in the United States in
violation of federal immigration laws.
(b) With respect to any such person who is arrested, and suspected of being
present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws, every law
enforcement agency shall do the following:
(1) Attempt to verify the legal status of such person as a citizen of the United
States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, an alien lawfully
admitted for a temporary period of time or as an alien who is present in the
United States in violation of immigration laws. The verification process may
include, but shall not be limited to, questioning the person regarding his or her
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date and place of birth, and entry into the United States, and demanding
documentation to indicate his or her legal status.
(2) Notify the person of his or her apparent status as an alien who is present
in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws and inform him or
her that, apart from any criminal justice precedings [sic], he or she must either
obtain legal status or leave the United States.
(3) Notify the Attorney General of California and the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status and provide
any additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.
(c) Any legislative, administrative, or other action by a city, county, or other
legally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries, or by
a law enforcement agency, to prevent or limit the cooperation required by
subdivision (a) is expressly prohibited.
SECTION 5. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Social Services.
Section 10001.5 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:
10001.5. (a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California that
only citizens of the United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United
States may receive the benefits of public social services and to ensure that all
persons employed in the providing of those services shall diligently protect public
funds from misuse, the provisions of this section are adopted.
(b) A person shall not receive any public social services to which he or she
may be otherwise entitled until the legal status of that person has been verified
as one of the following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
(c) If any public entity in this state to whom a person has applied for public
social services determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the information
provided to it, that the person is an alien in the United States in violation of
federal law, the following procedures shall be followed by the public entity:
(1) The entity shall not provide the person with benefits or services.
(2) The entity shall, in writing, notify the person of his or her apparent illegal
immigration status, and that the person must either obtain legal status or leave the
United States.
(3) The entity shall also notify the State Director of Social Services, the
Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status, and shall provide any
additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.
SECTION 6. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health Care.
Chapter 1.3 (commencing with Section 130) is added to Part 1 of Division 1
of the Health and Safety Code, to read:
CHAPTER 1.3. PUBLICLY FUNDED HEALTH CARE SERVICES
130. (a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California that,
excepting emergency medical care as required by federal law, only citizens of the
United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States may receive the
benefits of publicly-funded health care, and to ensure that all persons employed
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in the providing of those services shall diligently protect public funds from
misuse, the provisions of this section are adopted.
(b) A person shall not receive any health care services from a publicly-funded
health care facility, to which he or she is otherwise entitled until the legal status
of that person has been verified as one of the following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
(c) If any publicly-funded health care facility in this state from whom a person
seeks health care services, other than emergency medical care as required by
federal law, determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the information
provided to it, that the person is an alien in the United States in violation of
federal law, the following procedures shall be followed by the facility:
(1) The facility shall not provide the person with services.
(2) The facility shall, in writing, notify the person of his or her apparent illegal
immigration status, and that the person must either obtain legal status or leave the
United States.
(3). The facility shall also notify the State Director of Health Services, the
Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status, and shall provide any
additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.
(d) For purposes of this section "publicly-funded health care facility" shall be
defined as specified in Section 1200 and 1250 of the Health and Safety Code as
of January 1, 1993.
SECTION 7. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens From Public Elementary and
Secondary Schools.
Section 48215 is added to the Education Code, to read:
48215. (a) No public elementary or secondary school shall admit, or permit the
attendance of, any child who is not a citizen of the United States, an alien
lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, or a person who is otherwise
authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.
(b) Commencing January 1, 1995, each school district shall verify the legal
status of each child enrolling in the school district for the first time in order to
ensure the enrollment or attendance only of citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as
permanent residents, or persons who are otherwise authorized to be present in the
United States.
(c) By January 1, 1996, each school district shall have verified the legal status
of each child already enrolled and in attendance in the school district in order to
ensure the enrollment or attendance only of citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as
permanent residents, or persons who are otherwise authorized under federal law
to be present in the United States.
(d) By January 1, 1996, each school district shall also have verified the legal
status of each parent or guardian of each child referred to in subdivisions (b) and
(c), to determine whether such parent or guardian is one of the following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien admitted lawfully for a temporary period of time.
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(e) Each school district shall provide information to the State Superintendent
of Public Instruction, the Attorney General of California, and the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding any enrollee or pupil, or parent
or guardian, attending a public elementary or secondary school in the school
district determined or reasonably suspected to be in violation of federal
immigration laws within forty-five days after becoming aware of an apparent
violation. The notice shall also be provided to the parent or legal guardian of the
enrollee or pupil, and shall state that an existing pupil may not continue to attend
the school after ninety calendar days from the date of the notice, unless legal
status is established.
(f) For each child who cannot establish legal status in the United States, each
school district shall continue to provide education for a period of ninety days
from the date of the notice. Such ninety day period shall be utilized to accomplish
an orderly transition to a school in the child's country of origin. Each school
district shall fully cooperate in this transition effort to ensure that the educational
needs of the child are best served for that period of time.
SECTION 8. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Postsecondary
Educational Institutions.
Section 66010.8 is added to the Education Code, to read:
66010.8. (a) No public institution of postsecondary education shall admit,
enroll, or permit the attendance of any person who is not a citizen of the United
States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident in the United States, or
a person who is otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the
United States.
(b) Commencing with the first term or semester that begins after January 1,
1995, and at the commencement of each term or semester thereafter, each public
postsecondary educational institution shall verify the status of each person
enrolled or in attendance at that institution in order to ensure the enrollment or
attendance only of United States citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as permanent
residents in the United States, and persons who are otherwise authorized under
federal law to be present in the United States.
(c) No later than 45 days after the admissions officer of a public postsecondary
educational institution becomes aware of the application, enrollment, or attendance
of a person determined to be, or who is under reasonable suspicion of being, in
the United States in violation of federal immigration laws, that officer shall
provide that information to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the
Attorney General of California and the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The information shall also be provided to the applicant,
enrollee, or person admitted.
SECTION 9. Attorney General Cooperation with the INS.
Section 53069.65 is added to the Government Code, to read:
53069.65. Whenever the state or a city, or a county, or any other legally
authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries reports the
presence of a person who is suspected of being present in the United States in
violation of federal immigration laws to the Attorney General of California, that
report shall be transmitted to the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The Attorney General shall be responsible for maintaining on-going and
272 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW (Vol. 27
accurate records of such reports, and shall provide any additional information that
may be requested by any other government entity.
SECTION 10. Amendment and Severability.
The statutory provisions contained in this measure may not be amended by the
Legislature except to further its purposes by statute passed in each house by roll
call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring, or by
a statute that becomes effective only when approved by the voters.
In the event that any portion of this act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect any other provision
or application of the act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to that end the provisions of this act are severable.
